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Abstract
In many countries, as in Belgium, welfare services are provided by either local governmental, private nonprofit, or private commercial 
organizations. Next to that, welfare service delivery is often embedded in local communities. In this article, we measure the prevalence 
of these three types of organizations at the local level, for the policy areas of child care and elderly care. Through the theoretical lenses 
of demand-side, supply-side and social origins theories, we also try to find an explanation for this relative prevalence. The results we 
present can be helpful in defining the limits local governments face in coordinating the heterogeneous field of welfare service deliverers 
in their local community, a role they have to play since the new Flemish Decree on Local Social Policy. 
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Introduction
Traditionally, welfare services in Flanders are provided by either local government, by private nonprofit 
organisations (often embeddded in religious or ideological networks), or by private for-profit 
organisations. The service delivery organisations operate on the local level, as close as possible to the 
clients. Over time, this has resulted in a dense network of service providers from different sectors 
(public and private), although the prevalence of sectors varies a lot between municipalities. Studying 
these sectoral prevalences seems promising for theorising about the circumstances in which one or 
another sector prevails, especially in the case where local governments are expected to play a large role 
in coordinating and directing public service delivery governance regimes. This coordinating role has 
recently (2004) been confirmed by the Decree on Local Social Policy of the Flemish government. 
As we believe that local policies should be based on a thorough insight in (the reasons behind) the 
(possible) sectoral prevalences in welfare provision at the local governmental level, our exploration 
could support strategic choices of local governmments. This article wants to add to discussion by 
presenting an empirical investigation into the relative prevalence of three sectors (public, private 
nonprofit and private forprofit) in service delivery in two policy areas (residential elderly care and 
child care for children aged between 0 and 3 years) in Flemish municipalities. The article consists of 
three sections. Firstly, we sketch the service delivery landscape in both policy areas and compare and 
discuss the prevalence patterns in both areas. Secondly, we try to discuss the descriptive findings. We 
will address the question why a certain sectoral pattern can be observed in a certain municipality. 
Hypothetical explanations for the sectoral prevalences can be derived from a large literature that has 
been eloquently described by Anheier (2006, see also Gronbjerg & Paarlberg 2001, and Corbin 1999). 
In the conclusion, we will discuss our findings, both from a theoretical point of view, and in relation to 
the policy-relevant issue of local government’s role in coordinating complex policy areas.
Elderly Care and Child Care in Flemish Municipalities: The Complexity 
Disentangled
Flanders is a Dutch-speaking region in the federal state of Belgium. Belgian regions have their own 
parliament and government with extensive autonomous regional competences in (amongst other) the 
policy area of welfare services. This means that Flanders has law-making competences in the welfare 
area, although some (parts of) competences are still regulated and subsidised by the federal state. The 
local governmental level, which consists of 308 municipalities in Flanders, governed by their own 
elected local government, has some additional competences with regard to welfare policy-making, and 
is also responsible for the coordination of social policy at the local level. Its main role however consists 
of the delivery of welfare services, either directed and subsidised by the federal or Flemish government, 
or delivered on their own initiative, financed by their own means. Analysing the Flemish welfare 
landscape, child care and elderly care turned out to be the best areas to study local governance regimes, 
because in both policy areas, organizations of all three sectors deliver services. As we will explain in 
detail further, we observe commercial, private non-profit and public resthouses for the elderly, as well as 
commercial, private non-profit and public child care facilities. Finally, both policy areas are relevant, as 
increasing demographical (e.g. ageing population) and societal trends (e.g. higher labour participation 
of women), press government to expand service supply in both areas. 
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Residential elderly care in Flanders
Professional residential elderly care is about people moving permanently out of their house. People 
can go to a residential home for elderly care (a so-called resthouse), or a serviceflat. A serviceflat 
offers less specialistic care than a residential home does, and is designed for people that are still 
able to live autonomously and independent. People with special needs of a medical or nursery 
nature can go to a residential home were these care facilities are offered, besides common household 
facilities such as meals and leisure. There are approximately 76.000 places in residential homes and 
service flats. Most places (83%) are situated in residential homes. Relatively spoken, there are 5,85 
places in residential homes per 100 people older than 65 years, and 22 places per 100 people older 
then 80 years. Because residential homes are the dominant care service in elderly care, because the 
target groups of both elderly care services differ a lot, and because the demand for service flats is 
of a different degree compared to the demand for residential care, we decided to focus only on the 
supply of elderly care in residential homes. The Flemish government regulates the residential elderly 
care sector, and has an oversight on whether the quality norms are reached by care providers. If 
the norms about e.g. admission-policy, respect for ideological and religious belief of the resident, 
quality of services delivered, hygiene, etc. are reached, then Flemish government can recognize and 
concede the residential home, which is a necessary condition for establishing and managing an 
elderly care facility. Elderly care facilities that have received the Flemish governmental recognition, 
are subsidised both by the federal government and the Flemish government. 
Child care in Flanders
The Flemish child care is supervised by the public agency Kind en Gezin. Kind en Gezin does not 
deliver any care service itself, it only regulates, controls and subsidizes pre-school (for children between 
0-3 years) and out-of-school care (for children between 3-12 years). In the child care area there exists 
a difference between recognised and subsidised organisations on the one hand, and supervised but 
not (or hardly) subsidised organisations on the other hand. Supervised organisations are less heavily 
regulated with regard to personnel and infrastructural requirements, and can determine their own 
fees and admission criteria. Recognised and subsidised care providers are regulated intensely on 
quality and accessibility, and are obliged to ask parents a fee that depends on the taxable income 
and the familiar situation. The recognised and subsidised organisations have a public or nonprofit 
character, but this does not mean that all organisations with a certificate of supervision are for-profit 
organisations.3 Both the subsidised (public or private nonprofit) and the private forprofit sector 
consist of two types of child care: group care or familiar type care (in the house of the care provider). 
In 2007 there were 69.433 places in Flemish preschool child care, implying a relative number of 35 
places per 100 children from 0-3 year. Approximately two-third (64%) of the places are subsidised. 
54% of the places are of familiar care type, 46% are group care like. Data from Kind en Gezin 
show that early 2007, 83.600 children attended pre-school child care. Comparing this number 
of users with the roughest demand indicator (number of children between 0-3 years), shows that 
approximately 43% of Flemish young children make use of formal child care services. 
Sectoral prevalences in both policy areas
After having sketched the demand and supply side in both policy areas, we will now compare the 
sectoral prevalences in both areas.  We explore the prevalences in terms of places, and not in terms 
3   As the recognition of a provider is coupled to subsidies, and as the budget for enlargement of the sector is scarce, a lot of public and 
non-profi t organisations that want to be recognised or could be recognised, set up their own care organisations, without Flemish subsidies.
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of residences or organisations, as the minimal size of care providers differs a lot between the two 
policy areas. Table 1 contains comparative data on the sectoral prevalences in both policy areas.
Table 1: Sectoral prevalences in both policy areas
This table confirms the assumption that all three sectors are important actors in delivering care facilities 
in both elderly care and child care. In the area of elderly care, there is one sector that is rather small, as 
the forprofit sector represents only 11% of the total amount of places. In child care all three sectors 
represent more than 20% of the total capacity.  In both policy areas, the non-profit sector has the largest 
share in total capacity. The Flemish welfare policy, and more specific elderly care and child care, is thus 
a typical example of co-management (Brandsen & Pestoff 2008) of service delivery between different 
sectors (nonprofit, public, and to a lesser extent commercial). Table 1 also shows that most of the non-
profit capacity in child care is subsidised4, implying that the Flemish welfare area is a typical example of a 
governmentally subsidized policy area, in which the non-profit sector is mainly a government-dominant 
funded sector (Anheier 2006, Salamon & Anheier 1998). As the amount of places in both policy areas is 
large enough for statistical analysis and as all sectors take an important share of the total capacity in both 
fields, we are able to make a reliable analysis of sectoral prevalences at the local level. 
In Flanders, there are 308 municipalities, which are the units of analysis in this article. 5Table 2 
describes the existing variation between these municipalities with regard to the number of places in 
each sector. The total number of places in residential homes for elderly care varies from 0 to 5251. 
On average, in Flemish municipalities, there are 199 places in residential homes. In child care, the 
maximum number of places is 4494, but on average there are 225 places in a municipality.
Table 2: Supply of elderly and child care in Flemish municipalities (N=308)
ELDERLY CARE CHILD CARE
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Total places residences 2005 199 0 5.251 Total places 2007 225 0 4.494
Places in public sector 77,65 0 2.806 Places in public sector 47,19 0 1.535
Places in nonprofit sector 98,46 0 1.988 Places in nonprofit sector 112,46 0 2.065
Places in commercial sector 23,34 0 706 Places in commercial sector 65,79 0 1.137
4   In child care only 11% of the non-profi t places are not subsidized. In the public sector only 8% of the places are not subsidized.
5   For a good understanding of this paragraph it is useful to keep in mind that there exist huge differences between these units of analysis 
as big cities as Antwerp or Ghent are compared to smaller cities or very small villages.
Supply capacity 
(in places)
ELDERLY CARE CHILD CARE
Residential 
home %
Subsidised 
group care
Subsidised 
family 
care
Non-
Subsidised 
group care
Non-
subsidised 
family care
Total %
Public 23.923 38% 8.958 8.913 1.153 - 14.547 21%
Non-profit 34.423 54% 4.481 21.766 3.913 - 34.637 50%
For-Profit 
(Commercial) 7.036 11% - - 13.390 6.859 20.249 29%
Total 63.382 13.439 30.679 18.456 6.859 69.433
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Table 2 also suggests that there is a large variation between the 308 Flemish municipalities in 
terms of supply of welfare services, and in terms of types of supplying organizations. There are, in 
other words, as many types of local welfare policy governance regimes as there are municipalities 
in Flanders. This observation brings us to the next part, in which we will try to explain this 
variation.
Explaining Differences in Sectorial Prevalences
Theoretical explanations
Three sets of hypothetical explanations for the extent to which public and private organizations 
(non-profit, for-profit) are engaged in welfare service delivery can be derived from a large literature 
on theorising, that has been eloquently described by Anheier (2006, see also Anheier and Ben-
Ner 2003, Grönbjerg & Paarlberg 2001). These hypothetical explanations can be linked to (a) 
demand-side factors, (b) supply-side factors and (c) ‘social origins’ of the municipality.
a) Demand-side explanations
The first theoretical direction looks at the demand for welfare provision, or the needs for elderly 
and child care in municipalities. According to this line of reasoning, supply of elderly and child 
care will be organized in those municipalities where there is a  demand that is large enough. 
However, this assumption cannot explain which sector (public, nonprofit, forprofit) will supply 
the services in case of large demand. Therefore, we need other demand-side factors in a theoretical 
model. The concept of demand heterogeneity may be a valuable starting point (Weisbrod 1988, 
Anheier 2006). Public goods theory assumes that the public goods and services provided by 
the public sector will always have the quality and quantity as demanded/desired by the largest 
segment in the population (the so-called “median-voter”), because serving this largest segment of 
the population is electorally spoken most valuable for public officials. The marginal (electoral) 
gains of delivering services to minority groups outside the median-voter segment are too small for 
public officials. This means that some segments of the population are left unserved or insufficiently 
served by public supply, because these groups demand other levels of quality and/or quantity than 
the services provided by the public authority. In societies that are characterized by a large demand 
heterogeneity, these unserved demands will be large. Hence, in a heterogenous society, private 
supply will be larger, compared to public supply (private sector fills large gaps that are left by 
public sector supply). Whether private sector supply will be nonprofit or forprofit, will depend 
on the nature of the demander. We could for example hypothesize that private for profit initiatives 
will prevail in municipalities with elderly people or young families that are relatively spoken 
better off (financially). On the other hand, nonprofit providers can be assumed to fill the gaps 
at the other end of the societal spectrum, by addressing demands of people that are left unserved 
by private forprofit suppliers (market failure) and by public sector suppliers. If this assumption 
is correct, we will observe more private nonprofit initiatives in municipalities with a population 
that is relatively spoken more distressed or less well-off. Based on the demand-side arguments, 
we can formulate two hypotheses. Firstly, in municipalities with a heterogenous population, 
heterogenous demand will be addressed predominantly by private sector suppliers (governmental 
failure argument). In municipalities with a homogenous population, homogenous demand will 
be addressed by public sector supply (median-voter argument). Secondly, in municipalities with a 
population that is relatively spoken well-off in financial terms, we will observe a large for-profit 
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sector. In municipalities with a population that is characterized by higher levels of social distress, 
we will observe a larger private nonprofit sector (market-failure argument). 
b) Supply-side explanations
The second theoretical direction looks at the supply of welfare services. A lot of literature 
has been published already on the social entrepreneur, explaining why people start 
nonprofit initiatives. Corbin (1999), Booth et al (1989) and Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen 
(1991) all found that in municipalities that are relatively wealthy, there is a large private 
non-profit (and in some cases also profit) sector. Also the existence of human resources 
in a municipality (e.g. socio-economic status, education-levels, or age) may contribute 
positively to the size of the nonprofit sector (Galper 1999, Lincoln 1977, Guterbock & 
Fries 1997). These features point at a potential existence of entrepreneurs, which may be a 
prerequisite for a strong private sector (James 1987, Rose-Ackerman 1996, Young 1983). 
We can argue that in a municipality that is characterized by an averagely wealthy, well-
educated and middle-aged population, there will be a large private welfare sector, because 
conditions for entrepreneurship are good. Based on the supply-side arguments, we can 
hypothesize that in municipalities with a population that is wealthy, well-educated and has 
a large segment of middle-aged people, there will be fertile conditions for entrepreneurship, 
from which a large private sector can emerge (entrepreneurship argument).
c) ‘Social origins’ of the municipality
Social origins theory (Salamon & Anheier 1998, Anheier 2006) explains the prevalence 
of different sectors in public service delivery as the result of economic, social and political 
factors. Although the theory was initially developed by Salamon and Anheier for explaining 
size and composition of the nonprofit sector cross-nationally, some of the social origins 
arguments on sectoral prevalence could also be tested  on the local governmental level. As 
Flanders is a prototype of a pillarized society in which ideological organisations were/are 
strongly tied to specific political parties, electoral success of political parties at the local level 
in particular may be an important  factor for explaining sectoral prevalences. Ideologically, 
we could link the non-profit sector to the christian-democrat party (historically supporting 
private initiatives by religious congregations), the public sector can be linked to the socialist 
party (supporting public collectivistic service delivery), while the commercial sector is tied 
to the liberal party (supporting market solutions and private initiative for welfare service 
delivery). Hence, according to a social origins explanation, we may assume that the strength 
of a certain sector (public, nonprofit, commercial) in a municipality may depend on the 
dominant political ideology in that municipality. Moreover, and related to that, we can look 
at local governmental spending for social and welfare purposes. In the case where there 
is a lot of local governmental welfare funding, we might expect  a larger public sector in 
providing welfare services, compared to the private sector. Hence, we can hypothesize that the 
prevalence of different sectors in welfare service delivery depends on the dominant political 
ideology in a municipality (dominant ideology argument). In municipalities in which the 
christian-democrat party has a relative large share of seats in the municipality council, the 
non-profit sector will be larger. In municipalities with a strong social-democrat party, the 
public sector will be dominant. In municipalities with a strong liberal party, the commercial 
sector will be stronger. Secondly, we can hypothesize that in municipalities with a lot of local 
governmental welfare and social spending, there will be a larger public sector in elderly and 
child care provision, compared to the private sector (local governmental spending argument).
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Method and measurement
For testing the hypotheses formulated above, we perform linear regression analysis. The 
relative number of places in residential elderly care and child care facilities per municipality 
are the dependent variables. This is the number of places in (a) public, (b) private nonprofit 
and (c) private commercial residential homes or child care initiatives, divided by the total 
number of places in residential homes or child care initiatives in the municipality. Each 
municipality thus receives scores for the relative prevalence of places in elderly and child 
care facilities for three sectors (public/nonprofit/commercial). This score ranges from 0 to 1, 
with intermediate positions. For example, a municipality receiving score ‘0,5’ for commercial 
elderly care supply, means that half of the supply in elderly  is delivered by private commercial 
organizations in that municipality. As to the independent variables, the demand heterogeneity 
is measured by looking at the span of income. This is a measure of income heterogeneity 
and represents the difference (in euros) between the third and the first quartile (interquartile 
difference). A large interquartile difference suggest a large span of income, hence large 
income heterogeneity. A second demand variable is the number of distressed people. This 
variable is operationalised differently in both policy areas. In elderly care, it can be measured 
by looking at the number of elderly people that receives the minimal guaranteed income6 
per 1000 people of 65+. In child care, it can be measured by looking at the number of 
births in underprivileged families7 related to the total number of births. As to supply-side 
variables, we look at some measures that give an indication of the potential entrepreneurship 
in the municipality. First, the mean income that was declared to the fiscal authorities in a 
municipality. Second, the percentage of people in the age category of 40-59 years. Third, 
the number of low educated people that are unemployed (per 1.000 inhabitants). These 
measures are used, as previous research has shown that (social) entrepreneurship is more 
likely to be observed with middle-aged people that are relatively well-off (financially) or have 
had a higher education (e.g. Galper 1999). For measuring the social origins variables, we first 
use the dominant political ideology of a municipality as an independent variable. Therefore 
we use the electoral success of three political parties (christian-democrat CD&V, social-
democrat SP.a, and liberal VLD) in the elections for the local council in 1976 and 2000. 
We have constructed an index that reflects the mean electoral score of these parties for both 
election-years. By using an index that covers electoral scores over 25 years, we hope to be able 
to capture some aspects of dominant and persistent political ideologies in municipalities, 
rather than election-results (that are no more than a snapshot at one moment in time). As 
a second social origins feature, we look at local governmental spending for social and welfare 
funding, by measuring the number of euros the local government spends per capita to the 
public centre of social welfare (the public local institution for welfare).
6   This is the lowest income possible not to be officially in poverty.
7   This figure depends on subjective interpretations of family situations by nurses working for Kind en Gezin, the Flemish agency that 
regulates, subsidizes and controls the child care organisations. Every family is being judged on 6 criteria (income, educational level of par-
ents, working situation, living conditions, health care and level of educational stimulation). When a family gets a negative score on three of 
these criteria, the child is being considered as underprivileged.
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Table 3: Operationalisation and measurement of dependent and independent variables
Independent variables N Mean Min Max
Std.
Dev.
DEMAND-
MODEL
Span of income (2004) 308 21.068 12.880 33.049 3436
Distressed +65/total number of +65 (2006) 308 0,05 0,01 0,12 0,02
N births in underprivileged families/total N 
births (2007) 308 0,06 0,00 0,21 0,03
SUPPLY-
MODEL
Mean income (2003) 308 25.725 19.509 37.602 3.122
Percent age 40-59 (2005) 308 28,80 23,68 38,37 1,67
Low educated unemployed/1000 inh. (2006) 308 14,77 4,11 39,24 6,04
SP.a (social-democrat) 196 0,17 0,00 0,53 0,12
SOCIAL CD&V (Christian-democrat) 236 0,45 0,18 0,85 0,13
ORIGINS VLD (liberal) 119 0,22 0,02 0,62 0,11
Local govt. welfare spending per 1 inh. (2005) 308 83,87 0,000 218,76 36,92
Dependent variables
Places child care non-profit sector (relative) 290 0,34 0,00 1,00 0,36
Places child care public sector (relative) 290 0,18 0,00 1,00 0,28
Places child care commercial (relative) 290 0,48 0,00 1,00 0,36
Places elderly care nonprofit (relative) 288 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,42
Places elderly care public (relative) 288 0,36 0,00 1,00 0,39
Places elderly care commercial (relative) 288 0,14 0,00 1,00 0,29
The data we rely on for measuring the dependent and independent variables are taken from 
various databases8. The descriptive statistics for these variables are outlined in table 3 above. For 
all analyses, cases (municipalities) in which elderly care residences or child care providers are 
absent, are ommitted. These cases are ommitted, because we want to test the relative prevalence 
of the three sectors in welfare service delivery, rather than the absolute prevalence. This results in 
an N of 288 municipalities (elderly care) and 290 municipalities (in child care). 
Empirical results
The correlation and regression analysis result in two interesting findings. The correlation-matrix (see 
annex) shows at first that there exists no significant correlation between child care shares and elderly care 
shares. This means for example that a municipality with a large relative nonprofit supply in elderly care, 
not necessarily also has a strong nonprofit supply in child care. This suggests that governance regimes in 
both elderly and child care are not necessarily the same in Flemish municipalities. The lack of correlations 
between sectoral prevalences in different policy areas thus questions the value of our theoretical hypotheses 
as we would expect that -for instance- the presence of potential entrepreneurs would lead to a larger 
share of the non-profit sector in both areas. However, the differences between both policy areas may also 
point at the importance of area and/or sector specific features. Secondly, we observe significant negative 
correlations between sectoral supply in elderly care and in child care. This means that within both policy 
8  We collected relevant data from several existing databases like (1) local statistics provided by the Research Department of the Flemish 
government (Studiedienst Vlaamse regering), (2) statistics provided by the Flemish Child Care Agency (Kind en Gezin), (3) statistics 
provided by the Department of Welfare of the Flemish government, and (4) the Agency for Internal Policy (Agentschap voor Binnenlands 
Bestuur). The data on local elections were received from colleagues of the Free University Brussels (VUB).
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areas, there seems to be a kind of push aside effect between sectors. In other words, in municipalities where 
one sector is dominant, the other two sectors are less involved in the service delivery in that municipality. 9
Table 4: Summary of the linear regression analysis, standardized Beta-coefficients 
(Sig.: *** .01/** .05/* .10)
Independents Prediction7
Public
Supply (relative)
Nonprofit
supply
(relative)
Commercial
supply
(relative)
Elderly care 
N=288
Child care 
N=290
Elderly care 
N=288
Child care 
N=290
Elderly 
care 
N=288
Child care 
N=290
DEMAND
Span of income - (public) + (private) -0,12** 0,05 0,06 -0,01 0,08 -0,3
Distressed +65/1000 
people of +65 
+ (nonprofit) 
- (profit) 0,01 0,09 -0,14**
Distressed children + (nonprofit) - (profit) 0,04 0,21*** -0,24***
Adjusted R² 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,03 0,05
F 2,28 0,35 1,17 6,92 4,72 8,19
Sig. 0,10 0,70 0,31 0,00 0,01 0,00
SUPPLY
Mean income + (private) 0,09 0,13 -0,17** 0,00 0,12 -0,10
Percent age 40-59 + (private) -0,14** 0,08 0,06 0,07 0,10 -0,13**
Low educated 
unemployed/1000 inh. - (private) 0,23*** 0,16** -0,23*** 0,25*** 0,03 -0,37***
Adjusted R² 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,02 0,10
F 5,44 2,60 3,3 6,02 3,02 11,64
Sig. 0,00 0,05 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,00
SOCIAL ORIGINS
SP + (public) 0,14 -0,05 -0,0,9 0,09 -0,06 -0,06
CVP + (nonprofit) 0,14 -0,14 -0,09 0,11 -0,07 0,02
VLD + (commercial) -0,05 -0,08 0,10 -0,21 -0,08 0,35***
Local govt. welfare 
spending/inh. 
+ (public)
- (private) 0,40*** 0,14 -0,22** -0,08 -0,22* -0,05
Adjusted R² 0,15 0,00 0,04 0,03 0,00 0,10
F 4,8 0,85 1,79 1,66 1,01 3,22
Sig. 0,00 0,50 0,14 0,17 0,41 0,02
Three theoretical models for explaining the sectoral prevalence in elderly care and child care 
are tested. In table 3 the results of the linear regressions are presented. The demand-side model 
seems to be a weak explanation for the sectoral differences in supplying welfare services. For the 
dependent variables (supply in child and elderly care) the adjusted R² is low, ranging from 0,00 to 
0,05. However, some variables do have some explanatory power. We found for example that the 
span of income in a municipality is negatively related to the public sector welfare service provision 
in elderly care. This is in line with our hypothesis that in municipalities with a homogeneous 
demand, the public service delivery will prevail over private sector service delivery. The level 
9   Predicted impact of variable on public, private nonprofi t and/or private commercial supply. ‘+’ is positive impact (variable positively 
related to supply), ‘-‘ is negative impact. 
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of social distress is also a strong explanatory variable. In line with our hypotheses, we found 
that commercial service delivery in elderly care and child care will be stronger in municipalities 
that are less distressed. This is an important observation of policy relevance. We could question, 
with caution, whether in a marketized welfare sector that is dominated by commercial forprofit 
suppliers, all demands – and especially the demands of distressed socio-economic groups in society 
– would be addressed sufficiently. In municipalities with a population that is relatively more 
distressed, nonprofit supply will prevail, as we observed for child care. A possible explanation 
for this observation is that the number of distressed children is one parameter for distributing 
central governmental subsidies in child care. It could thus be the case that nonprofit providers 
in municipalities with a lot of distressed children have better chances to receive governmental 
subsidies (and that explains their larger prevalence in those municipalities).
The supply-side model offers a slightly better, but still rather poor explanation for the sectoral 
differences in supplying welfare services. 10% of the variation in commercial child care supply can 
be explained by the supply-side variables. But for the other dependent variables, the adjusted R² is 
rather low. The variables of entrepreneurship also yield some results however. The higher the average 
income in the municipality, the lower nonprofit elderly care supply. This finding is contrary to 
what we expected, this is a larger share of private initiatives because of favorable local conditions 
for (social or economical) entrepreneurship. We also observe that he higher the percentage of low 
educated unemployed people, the less private initiatives in child care (commercial) and elderly 
care (nonprofit), which is in line with our hypotheses. Thirdly, the higher the percentage of 
low educated unemployed people, the more public initiatives (in both elderly and child care). 
The latter observation can also be explained with the demand-side theoretical arguments, rather 
than with the supply-side theoretical arguments. A variable like the number of low educated 
unemployed people may tell us more about the demand for services, than about the supply of 
services. According to this line of reasoning, we could argue that public sector welfare provision is 
targeted at distressed people that are not sufficiently reached by private supply. This could also help 
to explain why we observed, fourtly, that nonprofit child care supply is stronger in municipalities 
with a lot of low educated unemployed people.  In such municipalities, the demand for income-
related child care (the amount of the fee for care depends on one’s income) may be higher, hence 
the observed positive relationship between the level of unemployment and nonprofit child (and 
public) care supply.   
Thirdly, in the ‘social origins’ model, one important variable for explaining sectoral prevalence 
is the extent to which the local government spends for welfare service delivery. This variable is 
positively related to public supply, and negatively related to private supply, but only in elderly 
care. This may be one explanation for the already observed push aside effect. The more the local 
government spends for delivering public welfare services, the less room for other (private) initiatives 
to deliver services in that municipality, because a large part of the demand for welfare services 
is already addressed by the local government. This push aside effect may even be strenghtened 
by central governmental policies. In elderly care for example, there exist programmation-norms 
issued by central government. According to these norms, in a municipality only a certain number 
of places in residences are subsidised by the central government (1 place per 100 people between 
60-74, 4 places per 100 people between 75-79, 12 places per 100 people 80-84, etc.). This policy 
results in a situation that only in those municipalities where current elderly care supply not meets 
the norm, there is still room for new initiatives. Potential (public or private) suppliers are thus 
dependent on the local situation for their chances to be able to invest in supplying services or 
not.10 A second kind of policy is that central governmental issues very strict quality norms (care, 
kitchen, safety, …). This means that the starting-up costs for new residences in elderly care (but 
10   In child care there does not exist a formal kind of programmation norm, but the fact that scarce Flemish child care subsidies are allo-
cated based on rankings of communities within every province,  it is clear that communities beneath the ranking hardly make any chance 
to get subsidies.
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also for child care initiatives) are very high because of necessary investments to meet these norms. 
To a certain extent, these policies by central government lead to a more or less stable public-
private distribution: new initiatives are only possible in municipalities where the norm is not 
reached yet, and it is easier to adapt existing infrastructure to the (ever increasing) quality norms, 
than to invest in new and very expensive infrastructure. 
CONCLUSION 
We observed large differences between municipalities in sectoral prevalences in both policy-areas. 
This suggests that there are many different governance regimes in delivering welfare services at 
the level of Flemish municipalities. In search for an explanation of these differences in sectoral 
prevalence, we developed hypotheses that are linked to three different theoretical models 
(demand, supply and municipality features). Statistical analysis shows that these models at best 
can only be partially supported. Still, some variables have some significant explanatory power. 
The findings, however, urge for a better contextualization of explanations. The explanatory value 
of the variables that turned out to be our strongest predictors  - ‘social distress’, ‘unemployment’, 
and ‘local government spending’ – can only be fully understood when contextualizing them in 
the context of Flemish governmental policies in both policy areas of child care and elderly care. 
This is especially the case in countries like Flanders, that are characterized by a large private sector 
besides a large public sector, and where nonprofits are heavily subsidized and regulated by central 
(Flemish) government. In Flanders, both public sector and private sector serve the same target 
group with the same (governmental) means. This is a different situation compared to countries 
where the private (nonprofit) sector has less direct links with government, and is mainly funded 
by fees and donations (Anheier 2006). 
As we observed no correlation between the sectoral prevalences in both policy areas, our 
analysis suggested that area specific features may determine to a large extent the relative prevalence 
of each sector. The fact that the size of child care organisations is often smaller, compared to the 
size of residential homes for elderly care, makes it more plausible that two or more sectors are 
present in child care in a given municipality. Also the use of explicit or implict programmation 
norms determines if a sector will be active in a municipality and to what extent. The existence 
of a governmental programmation norm for residential homes leads for instance to a stronger11 
push aside effect in elderly care than in child care. The fact that the Flemish government uses the 
number of distressed children as one of its criteria to allocate scarce resources to public and/or 
non-profit organisations in municipoalities explains the larger share of the non-profit sector in 
municipalities with a lot of disstressed children. 
From a policy point of view, this article also implies important issues for discussion and further 
research. We can conclude, in general terms, that local governments only have little room for 
manoeuvre in coordinating and steering local social policy. They are, however, expected to do 
so according to the Decree on Local Social Policy (2004). As our case studies of elderly care 
and child case shows, the prevalence of private suppliers (and hence the extent to which the 
service delivery governance regime is complex) is strongly determined by factors that are beyond 
the direct influence of local governments. Socio-economic factors like the level of distress in 
the municipality, or the number of low educated unemployed (in itself a measure of distress) 
seem to determine the extent to which private supply in elderly and child care is present at the 
local level. Moreover, the supply of child care and elderly care is also determined, directly or 
indirectly, by central governmental policy in the policy area concerned. This is important, as 
the steering authority of local governments towards private suppliers operating at its territory is 
11   Further analysis showed that in 162 of the 308 municipalities only one sector was delivering elderly care. Such a hegemonic situation 
was less frequent (only in 90 municipalities) in child care.
Welfare services in Flemish municipalities
164  |  JSRP
virtually inexisting, because private suppliers are regulated (subsidised, controlled, …) by central 
government (Verschuere & De Rynck 2009). So the more private supply, the harder to direct 
the service delivery field, it seems. The only influence local government has at its disposal, is 
the possibility to organize elderly care or child care via own local governmental initiatives. We 
observe a push aside effect, in the sense that in local governments with a large own supply there 
is fewer private supply. In this scenario, directing the service delivery field seems easier, as local 
governments can hierarchically steer their own service supplying organizations. But, knowing 
that a lot of local governments in Flanders operate at a very small scale (57% of Flemish local 
governments have less that 15.000 inhabitants), it will depend on the (financial) capacities of 
local governments whether they can provide a lot of own service delivery. 
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Annex 
Table 5: Correlation-analysis (Pearson) between the dependent variables (Sig: ** 0,01 level)
Nonprofit 
supply 
child care 
(relative)
Public 
supply 
child care 
(relative)
For profit 
supply 
child care 
(relative)
Nonprofit 
supply 
elderly 
care 
(relative)
Public 
supply 
elderly 
care 
(relative)
For profit 
supply 
elderly 
care 
(relative)
Nonprofit 
supply child 
care (relative)
1 -0,333(**) -0,592(**) -0,028 0,091 -0,083
Public supply 
child care 
(relative)
1 -0,311(**) -0,064 0,015 0,073
Commercial 
supply child 
care (relative)
1 0,087 -0,028 -0,089
Nonprofit 
supply elderly 
care (relative)
1 -0,753(**) -0,436(**)
Public supply 
elderly care 
(relative)
1 -0,264(**)
For profit 
supply elderly 
care (relative)
1
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